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The Snowden documents have revealed that intelligence agencies conduct large-scale 
digital surveillance by exploiting vulnerabilities in the hardware and software of 
communication infrastructures. These vulnerabilities have been characterized as 
“weaknesses,” “flaws,” “bugs,” and “backdoors.” Some of these result from errors in the 
design or implementation of systems, others from unanticipated uses of intended 
features. A particularly subtle kind of vulnerability arises from the manipulation of 
technical standards to render communication infrastructures susceptible to surveillance. 
Technical standards have a powerful influence on our digital environment: They shape 
the conditions under which digital citizenship is exercised. The Snowden revelations 
brought to the forefront the role of intelligence agencies in the standards-making 
process, lending new urgency to the debate over the adequacy and legitimacy of the 
current mechanisms used for negotiating standards. This article explores how influence 
is exercised in the production of standards and the implications this has for their 
trustworthiness and integrity. 
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In this article, we discuss the results of an exploratory study based on interviews conducted in 
2015, two years after the Snowden disclosures, to understand how the Snowden documents have 
influenced attitudes to surveillance and privacy within certain standards organizations and associated 
institutions. We examine the social processes that produce technical standards, the role of standards in 
enabling or hindering surveillance, and the involvement of intelligence agencies in the negotiation and 
agreement of standards. Our aim is to bring to the attention of a communication studies audience a recent 
political turn in certain standards bodies, which is only the latest development in a long history of 
contention over the social and political effects of technical standards for communication infrastructures.  
 
We begin by describing the role of technical standards within digital infrastructures and the 
general characteristics of the standards-making process, framed as a practice of negotiation and 
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agreement. We then examine how intelligence agencies participate in standards making, the tensions such 
participation produces, and its implications for the trustworthiness and integrity of standards. Following 
this, we discuss the ways in which standards bodies and related institutions have responded to the 
Snowden disclosures, with a particular focus on organizations affected by the efforts of the U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) to influence and subvert technical standards, as revealed by the Snowden 
documents. Finally, we close with an exploration of possibilities for mitigating the influence of intelligence 
agencies on the standards-making process. 
 
The Role of Standards 
 
Standards can be defined as agreed characteristics that facilitate compatibility across products 
and processes within a particular domain (Nadvi & Wältring, 2004). Within the ICT domain, the 
organizations responsible for developing standards are a diverse collection of government institutions, 
nongovernmental organizations, industry consortia, academic institutions, professional associations, and 
loosely organized groups of individuals. Within each standards-making organization, working groups 
attempt to reach agreement on common solutions to technical challenges (Weiss & Cargill, 1992). When a 
standard is agreed on, it is specified in documents that establish uniform technical criteria, methods, 
processes, and practices.  
 
Standards not only facilitate the technical coordination of geographically distributed systems, 
they also serve a political function. Coordinating transnational stakeholders in a process of negotiation and 
agreement through the development of common rules is a form of global governance (Nadvi, 2008). The 
resulting standards become normative documents that define the material conditions for global digital 
communication. Since there is no global government, global governance has been described as “an 
instance of governance in the absence of government” (Ruggie, 2014, p. 5). Standards are among the 
mechanisms by which this governance is achieved. Conformance to certain standards is often a basic 
condition of participation in international trade and communication, so there are strong economic and 
political incentives to conform, even in the absence of legal requirements (Russell, 2014). The American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI, 2010) describes this situation succinctly: 
 
Emerging economies understand that standards are synonymous with development and 
request standards-related technical assistance programs from donor countries. 
Increasingly our trading partners utilize such programs to influence the selection of 
standards by these economies and create favorable trade alliances. (p. 5) 
 
Negotiation, Consensus, and Complexity  
 
Standards are created through a diverse range of social processes. Russell (2014) distinguishes 
among de facto standards, which arise from common usage; de jure standards, which are mandated by 
law; and voluntary consensus standards, which are developed through a process of negotiation among 
certain interested parties. Participation in this process and adoption of the resulting standards are 
voluntary, which should be understood to mean an absence of legal requirements rather than an absence 
of economic or political pressures.  
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Camp and Vincent (2005) describe four models used to develop ICT standards, each of which has 
its own processes of negotiation and acceptance. The government model is a state-controlled process; the 
consortium model consists of members, usually corporations, who must pay a fee to participate; the 
professional association model includes members who share the same skills, knowledge, and practices; 
and the open model allows any individual to participate, with mechanisms for appointing members to 
coordination and oversight roles. 
 
Each of these models has different degrees of transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness, 
but all involve a process of negotiation and consensus building through which participants in working 
groups exert their influence to reach agreement on specifications that reflect their specific interests (Weiss 
& Cargill, 1992). When standards are adopted voluntarily, once they are agreed on, consensus is vital to 
ensure their widespread implementation. During this process, participants with greater market power hold 
similarly greater influence over working groups. Weiss and Cargill (1992) note that negotiations within 
voluntary consortia are unequal interactions because of this influence based on market share, while Diffie 
and Landau (1998) observe that the purchasing power of governments can cause standards developed for 
government use to become de facto commercial standards. 
 
As unequal participants compete to define standards, technological compromises emerge, which 
add complexity to standards. For instance, when working group participants propose competing solutions, 
it may be easier for them to agree on a standard that combines all the proposals rather than choosing any 
single proposal. This shifts the responsibility for selecting a solution onto those who implement the 
standard, which can lead to complex implementations that may not be interoperable. On its face this 
appears to be a failure of the standardization process, but this outcome may benefit certain participants—
for example, by allowing an implementer with large market share to establish a de facto standard within 
the scope of the documented standard. 
 
The voluntary consensus approach to standards making became the norm in the field of 
computer networking between the 1970s and 1990s, accompanied by an “ideology of open standards” 
(Russell, 2014, p. 21) that linked the open standards-making process with the ideals of participatory 
democracy, open markets, individual autonomy, and social progress. Telecommunications standards, in 
contrast, remain dominated by the International Telecommunications Union and associated organizations 
with strong historical links to national governments. 
 
Standards have been framed as public goods because they can be made available for anyone to 
use (Kindleberger, 1983). However, this conceptualization has been challenged by pointing to situations in 
which private consortia prioritize corporate over public interests; a limited range of actors are involved in 
standardization; license fees are charged for using standards; and standards organizations are 
accountable only to their members (Bunduchi, Williams, & Graham, 2004). These and other social traces 
embedded in the standards-making process ultimately manifest in the features and functionality 
incorporated in products and services. In the ICT domain, these traces affect how citizens’ privacy and 
security are safeguarded or endangered in their everyday use of digital tools. 
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Empirical Study Methodology  
 
For this research, we wanted to understand how issues of surveillance and privacy were 
negotiated within certain standards organizations and associated institutions, using the Snowden 
revelations as a focus for our inquiry. To achieve this, we conducted a semistructured interview study in 
which we discussed the role of standards in enabling or hindering surveillance; the relationship between 
standards organizations and intelligence agencies; individual and organizational attitudes to surveillance 
and privacy; and the effect, if any, of the Snowden leaks on these attitudes.  
 
Data from eight interviews are included in this article. The interview subjects were participants in 
11 standards-making bodies and associated institutions. Each of these organizations is involved in 
developing and coordinating the technical systems that make up the global communication infrastructure.1 
Six of the organizations are concerned with developing standards; one with certifying implementations; 
one with governance of infrastructure; and three with technical research. A brief overview of each 
organization is given in Table 1. It is important to note that there is cross-fertilization among these 
groups, with many participants attending working groups in multiple organizations. We focused on 
organizations whose work is relevant to the surveillance of communication, and especially organizations 
affected by the NSA’s attempts to influence and subvert technical standards, as revealed by the Snowden 
documents. This places the United States at the center of our inquiry, as the documented instances of 
subversion affected both U.S. and global standards bodies, as we will describe. 
 
Interviews were audio recorded and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.2 The audio was 
transcribed and analyzed using qualitative methods informed by thematic analysis (Guest, MacQueen, & 
Namey, 2012), with which themes are identified and coded across interviews. Through the identification of 
themes, concepts, practices, and activities, we analyzed the interview data to understand the ways in 
which the Snowden revelations have impacted these organizations. 
 
We present findings from this study and discuss the implications for technological infrastructure 
and digital citizenship. Our findings are divided into four sections. First, we discuss how the characteristics 
of the standards-making process affect the susceptibility of technological infrastructures to surveillance. 
Next, we examine intelligence agency participation in standards making and the ways in which agencies 
influence technical standards. We then describe responses to the Snowden revelations that each 
interviewee has seen within the organizations in which he or she participates. Finally, we discuss possible 







                                                 
1 A useful graphic that summarizes this ecology is available at https://www.icann.org/news/multimedia/78  
2 One of the interviewees declined to be recorded. 
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Table 1. Organizations in Which Interviewees Participated. 
 






Nonprofit organization Europe 
GCF Global Certification Forum Standards compliance Industry partnership Global 




Nonprofit organization Global 
ICANN Internet Corporation for 




Nonprofit organization Global 






Nonprofit organization Global 




Individual participants Global 
IRTF Internet Research Task Force Research Individual participants Global 







LMS London Mathematical Society Professional 
association 
Nonprofit organization UK 
NIST National Institute for 






W3C World Wide Web Consortium Standards 
development 
Industry consortium Global 
 
 
Consensus Standards, Complexity, and Surveillance 
 
We described how complexity emerges in the standards-making process and why it is a key 
characteristic of voluntary consensus standards, arising from negotiation between participants with 
competing interests who need to reach technological compromises. Such an arrangement has specific 
effects with regard to surveillance, as described by two of our interviewees. 
 
Large companies want complex standards because it makes it harder for competitors to 
enter the market, but, of course, large complex standards are also good for the NSA 
because it means that nobody can actually implement them securely. So even if the 
standards themselves are secure, the implementations will not be. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, 
and NIST participant) 
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I think there are people who actively push within the IETF to make sure that every 
standard has a dozen different options. . . . IPsec [Internet Protocol Security3] is a 
classic example of something that really should have been widely adopted a long time 
ago and was not . . . because everybody implemented a different set of the options and 
so they didn’t interoperate very well, and the complexity I think really killed the hopes of 
broad adoption. I don’t know whether that was a deliberate attempt to kill it by 
overloading it with features or whether that was actually people who were like, but my 
version really is better and it needs to be folded in too. (IETF and IRTF participant) 
 
Whether complexity arises unintentionally as a by-product of negotiation, or is intentionally 
fostered by certain participants to advance their own interests, it can increase the susceptibility of 
communication systems to surveillance. For example, a standard that is implemented inaccurately or 
incompletely may be vulnerable to exploitation, whereas a standard with many incompatible 
implementations may not achieve wide adoption, which, in the case of cryptographic standards, would 
leave communication unprotected. 
 
Intelligence Agency Participation in Standards Making 
 
The Snowden files reveal intelligence agency interest in manipulating the standards-making 
process. According to documents leaked by Snowden, the NSA seeks to “influence policies, standards and 
specifications for commercial public key technologies”4 (Perlroth, Larson, & Shane, 2013, para. 32). The 
agency “actively engages the U.S. and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage 
their commercial products’ designs. These design changes make these systems exploitable through 
SIGINT [signals intelligence] collection” (Ball, Borger, & Greenwald, 2013, para. 18). 
 
Leaked documents describe a specific instance of this manipulation: an NSA-engineered 
“backdoor”5 in a 2006 cryptographic standard, which experts have identified as the Dual Elliptic Curve 
Deterministic Random Bit Generator, or Dual EC DRBG (Bernstein, Lange, & Niederhagen, 2015). The 
flawed algorithm was standardized by ANSI, and subsequently by NIST and ISO, and was implemented in 
Internet hardware and dozens of software libraries (Bernstein et al., 2015; Goodin, 2016). The backdoor 
allows the NSA to guess cryptographic keys used by devices that implement the standard, and thus to 
decrypt their communications. 
 
The NSA’s involvement in standards making is not in itself news: the agency has a dual 
responsibility for conducting foreign surveillance and securing domestic information systems, and its 
employees openly participate in standards bodies, ostensibly to serve the latter role. However, the 
Snowden documents confirm a longstanding suspicion that the NSA sometimes uses its information 
security mission as cover to advance its surveillance mission by subverting technical standards. 
 
                                                 
3  Internet Protocol Security is an encrypted and authenticated form of the Internet Protocol. 
4  Public key technologies refers to a form of cryptography. 
5  In cryptography, a backdoor is a vulnerability that can only be exploited by certain parties. 
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The NSA has participated in standards development since the first civilian encryption standards 
were published in the 1970s (Banisar & Schneier, 1999). Throughout the 1980s, the agency vied with the 
National Bureau of Standards (later NIST) for control of civilian cryptographic standards, with a 1989 
memorandum of understanding between the two agencies giving the NSA an effective veto over NIST’s 
work (Diffie & Landau, 1998). 
 
In the early 1990s, the NSA allied its national security arguments with the law enforcement 
arguments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to promote policies and standards favorable to 
surveillance. The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act required telephone companies 
to adopt standardized interfaces for “lawful intercept” surveillance; the law did not mandate a particular 
standard, but required industry to develop and implement one. Lawful intercept interfaces were built into 
equipment sold around the world, providing other governments with de facto wiretapping capabilities 
equivalent to those defined by U.S. law. The lawful intercept features in exported telecoms equipment 
were also exploited by the NSA for intelligence purposes (Bamford, 2015; Devereaux, Greenwald, & 
Poitras, 2014). 
 
For GSM and 3G, they provided lawful intercept interfaces, but of course we know from 
the Greek case in 20106 that actually one of those interfaces has been used by a third 
party, and we still don’t know who this third party is—it could be organized crime, it 
could be another nation. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, and NIST participant) 
 
If you look at the quoted case about the Bahamas network,7 it was exactly that lawful 
interception interface that apparently was abused [by the NSA] in order to take a full 
take on all the mobile calls in the Bahamas for a month or two. (IETF participant) 
 
Historically, the NSA’s overt influence on technical standards reached its peak in the 1990s, with 
Clipper, a proposed NIST standard for secure telephony using a secret NSA encryption algorithm. Clipper 
included a “key escrow” feature allowing calls to be decrypted for surveillance purposes. The proposal 
attracted widespread criticism on technical and political grounds, and was an embarrassing failure for the 
NSA and FBI. After legal restrictions on the export of cryptographic software were overturned in 1996, it 
appeared that the NSA’s effort to control civilian cryptography was at an end. NIST organized a widely 
praised public competition to select a new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), establishing its 
trustworthiness as a developer of robust and independent standards. 
 
Twenty years ago, NIST proposed an escrow standard . . . [which] was not good for 
their international reputation and to build trust into NIST because, of course, the keys 
would be held by the U.S. Government and not by any other government. But I think by 
organizing the AES competition in the late nineties, and more recently the SHA-3 
competition, NIST has built up quite some credibility in having open standards and 
advocating strong security for everybody. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, and NIST participant) 
                                                 
6 Bamford (2015) argues that the third party was the NSA. 
7 See Devereaux et al. (2014). 
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However, because of the Snowden disclosures, we now know that the NSA continued to use its 
relationship with NIST to influence cryptographic standards, exploiting the trust that NIST had earned. The 
NSA proposed Dual EC DRBG to ANSI, ISO, and NIST in parallel, using the ANSI standardization effort to 
argue for the algorithm’s adoption by the other bodies. Documents released under the Freedom of 
Information Act show that NIST cryptographers did not fully understand the algorithm they were being 
asked to standardize and relied on the NSA’s advice.8 
 
The existence of a potential backdoor in Dual EC DRBG was recognized by participants in the 
ANSI working group as early as 2005 and was publicly revealed by academic cryptographers in 2007 
(Bernstein et al., 2015). Even so, NIST did not revise its standard or openly investigate the issue until 
after the Snowden revelations, when it commissioned a study into how its internal processes has been 
manipulated (Cerf et al., 2014).  
 
It’s kind of amazing how bold [the NSA was] because, in fact, they were caught and 
NIST didn’t do anything. But, in 2007, they were caught in public, and so it shows how 
bold they are, that they actually dared to undermine public standards in the open view 
of everybody. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, and NIST participant) 
 
I do think that that particular NIST revelation did have a large impact on the standards 
groups that I follow, that the IETF was already talking about Snowden, but talked about 
it much more urgently . . . . after this NIST piece because it was actually subversion of a 
standards-setting organization and there was some remote possibility of that in W3C. 
(IETF and W3C participant) 
 
There is also evidence that the NSA made several attempts to subvert an IETF standard. Between 
2006 and 2010, four extensions were proposed to the Transport Layer Security protocol used to encrypt 
Web and e-mail traffic. Adoption of any of the extensions would have made exploitation of the Dual EC 
DRBG backdoor much easier (Checkoway et al., 2014). Three of the proposals were co-authored by NSA 
employees. Although none of the proposals became IETF standards, one was implemented in a software 
library sold by RSA Security.9 Documents leaked by Snowden reveal that the NSA paid RSA $10 million to 
use Dual EC DRBG in the same library (Menn, 2013). 
 
The subversion of two separate technical standards produced by different organizations, 
combined with a commercial contract to ensure the use of both subverted standards in a software library 
sold to third parties, demonstrates the sophistication of the NSA’s strategy. Every stage of the process—
from the initial proposal, through negotiation and consensus, to implementation and adoption—was 
influenced to produce the desired result: encryption products that were flawed in such a way as to enable 
decryption by the NSA. 
 
                                                 
8  See https://github.com/matthewdgreen/nistfoia and Cerf et al. (2014). 
9  In software, a library is a component that can be reused in many different products. 
810  Michael Rogers and Grace Eden                             International Journal of Communication 11(2017) 
 
The potential for standards to be subverted or compromised during the negotiation process has 
led to disagreement about whether intelligence agency employees should be allowed to participate in 
working groups. Having an employee of an intelligence agency in a leadership role is particularly 
controversial because these roles include extra responsibilities, such as consensus building, which can 
sway outcomes within the decision-making process. 
 
The NSA people come to the ISO meetings, they participate to the IETF, they are even 
vice chairs of working groups, and so on. . . . and I think, in many cases, they 
participate there to improve security and to make sure that everything works well. But 
given what we learned about the BULLRUN program,10 they also do it to actually make 
sure that things do not go well and actually some bad things happen. Of course, it’s very 
hard in a complex world to decide in specific cases whether the intentions of these 
agencies are good or bad for any specific claim they make or any specific thing they do. 
(ETSI, IACR, ISO, and NIST participant) 
 
It is clear that the intentions and methods of intelligence agencies remain problematic for the 
standards-making process. Yet there is no simple solution: even if intelligence agencies were excluded 
from direct participation, they could participate covertly via proxies or front organizations. The NSA works 
with numerous external contractors who could be tasked with participating on its behalf. 
 
I think if you would [exclude intelligence agencies from participation], then they would 
actually start acting through third parties. They would start a company or they would 
bribe somebody in a company or use somebody in a company and then you wouldn’t 
know. So I think in some sense it’s fine to have them participate. I understand the 
reservations of people if they take a more active role and whether we should let them be 
the chair or vice chair is another question. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, and NIST participant) 
 
It might be argued, however, that the NSA’s reputation for cryptographic expertise, its 
responsibility for securing domestic information systems, and its access to secret information lend 
authority to its arguments in working groups and allow it to propose features for which no public 
justification can be given. This appears to have been the case with Dual EC DRBG, where NIST’s 
cryptographers deferred to the expertise of their NSA colleagues. Had the NSA been forced to hide its 
participation behind a third party, its contributions might have been subject to more critical scrutiny. We 
return to the issue of mitigating covert influence on standards making in the final section of the article. 
 
Responses to the Snowden Revelations  
 
The worldwide response to the Snowden disclosures has been enormous. Both the multifaceted 
nature of the attacks and their scale came as a shock to many technical experts, activists, journalists, and 
citizens. What had in the past been treated as hypotheticals were now documented facts. In this section 
                                                 
10 An NSA program revealed by Snowden that uses undisclosed techniques to defeat encryption. 
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we highlight how participants in standards organizations and related institutions have responded to the 
revelations. 
 
Internet Engineering Task Force  
 
The IETF has a long history of engaging with surveillance issues. In 1996, the organization’s 
steering group published a statement supporting access to strong cryptography “for all Internet users in 
all countries,” (IAB and IESG, 1996, p. 2) and in May 2000 the IETF declared that it would not develop 
standards for wiretapping.11 
 
The first Snowden files were released in June 2013, and the following month a side meeting was 
organized at an IETF conference in Berlin to discuss the implications of the NSA’s XKEYSCORE program. 
The result was the creation of a mailing list, perpass (short for pervasive passive surveillance),12 in which 
IETF participants had a forum to discuss the ways in which this and other surveillance programs could be 
countered. The fruits of these discussions included the formation of new working groups to develop 
solutions for expanding encryption capabilities across the Internet.13  
 
In November 2013, the IETF hosted a discussion of the implications of the Snowden leaks at a 
conference plenary in Vancouver.14 The meeting attracted over one thousand participants who discussed 
surveillance, its relationship to technical infrastructure, and how the IETF should respond. It culminated in 
an agreement that led to the publication of Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack in May 2014.15 This is a 
“process” rather than a “technical” document, and thus has an impact on every strand of work the IETF 
does, including the development and revision of standards. Working groups must now consider pervasive 
monitoring alongside other security properties and provide guidance for how such attacks could be 
mitigated. 
 
The IETF has consensus on the fact that we should be mitigating this attack. We should 
be putting in place the technical mitigations that we know exist that can affect this and 
make the attack harder. They may not make it impossible but they can make it much 
more costly or make it very hard and we should do that. (IETF participant) 
 
A long time participant in the IETF . . . had a great way of expressing it. He said, “Listen, 
we’ve spent 20 years optimizing for bandwidth and for speed and it’s time that we also 
started optimizing for privacy.” . . . So now there is a growing awareness that this 
actually is one of the priorities and it’s a priority that needs to be put on par with the 
traditional priorities of speed and cost. (IETF and IRTF participant) 
 
                                                 
11  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804  
12  https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=perpass  
13  https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter and https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tcpinc/charter  
14  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV71hhEpQ20  
15  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258  
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More recently, the IETF published Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat 
Model and Problem Statement16—an informational document that examines changing threat models as a 
result of the Snowden revelations. 
 
Whereas previously we would have assumed in our threat models that the attacker 
would try to be kind of parsimonious and attack the cheapest or the weakest link in the 
chain, these guys go for every link. . . . So we have to consider the threat model slightly 
differently and we have a bunch of people working on that. (IETF participant) 
 
Technical standards specifically designed to hinder mass surveillance are also in development, 
using an approach called opportunistic security, in which encryption is automatically enabled whenever it 
is available.17 It remains to be seen how complex these standards will be, and whether or not they will be 
widely adopted by industry. 
 
In one sense, the IETF response to the Snowden revelations has been robust, reacting quickly 
and opening up channels of communication for its participants to discuss the issue though meetings, 
plenary sessions, and mailing lists. But the response has largely treated surveillance as a technical 
problem—one that is external to the IETF itself. The response to possible subversion of the IETF 
standards-making process has been less strong. 
 
In 2013, following the Snowden revelations, an IETF and IRTF participant requested that an NSA 
employee be removed as cochair of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG), an IRTF group that 
provides cryptographic advice on IETF standards.18  
 
We had a big fuss last year because one of the cochairs of CFRG was an NSA employee, 
but actually that’s okay. I defended him to the death because if we start firing people 
because of who pays their salary, we’re screwed. And as far as I know, he’s a genuine 
guy who’s doing the right things. He has since retired from NSA, and from being cochair 
of the group. But there was a big fuss on the CFRG mailing list about a year and a half 
ago. (IETF participant) 
  
This quote is interesting on two levels. First, it expresses a particular view of how working groups 
operate, and second, it suggests that this view is a norm that must be upheld: Participants should not be 
judged by their affiliations, but by whether they are “a genuine guy.” This reflects the official position of 
the IETF that individuals participate on their own behalf, rather than as representatives of organizations. 
However, when organizations are known to be paying individuals to influence and in some cases subvert 
standards, we must ask whether this view of working group dynamics remains tenable.  
 
                                                 
16  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7624  
17  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7435  
18  https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03554.html  
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One of our interviewees strongly criticized the response of the IETF and IRTF to the issue of 
intelligence agency involvement in working groups, and no longer takes part in either organization as a 
result.19 The interviewee argued that the IETF’s governance mechanisms had been appropriate when it 
was a small group of people who knew and trusted each other, and whose goals were aligned with those 
of the military research establishment that developed the early Internet. However, as the organization 
grew, it had continued to rely on the same core group of individuals to steer it while regarding itself as an 
open, transparent, and nonhierarchical organization. This left the IETF unable to address the question of 
whether its core participants could be trusted. 
 
Freeman (1972) argues that all social groups contain informal structures of this kind, but groups 
that perceive themselves as “structureless” cannot recognize, and therefore challenge, their informal 
structures. While the IETF has some formal rules and structures, it describes itself as a “loosely self-
organized group of people” (Hoffman, 2012, Section 2, para. 1) and emphasizes “rough consensus” 
(Clark, 1992, p. 543) and “personal judgment” (Hoffman, 2012, Section A.3, para. 1) as its governing 
principles.20 It is perhaps significant that the issue of an NSA employee cochairing a working group was 
settled informally. 
 
Internet Research Task Force  
 
The IRTF investigates key research themes that may contribute to the development of future 
IETF standards. Because of this, there is crossover between participants in these organizations. The IRTF 
has recently formed the Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group (HRPC),21 which is 
developing a glossary document that maps technical terms to human rights terms with the aim of linking 
concepts across these two domains. The group has also developed a methodology document that provides 
guidance for how to analyze the corpus of Internet standards produced by the IETF within a human rights 
context. 
 
At the IETF meetings, we have HRPC meetings and when they were first proposed, my 
biggest fear was that they were just going to be like yes, you can have a room, go off 
and do your thing and everyone can ignore you now. . . . But in practice, what’s actually 
happened is that a lot of people have come to it and said we want to talk about this. We 
want to build this discussion. So, in some ways, whether the documents end up being 
concretely useful or not, having a place to have the discussion I think has raised the 
awareness of the issue within the IETF and is helping to build consensus around the idea 
that these things are related. (IETF and IRTF participant) 
 
Although the creation of the HRPC was not a direct response to the Snowden revelations, the 
disclosures have increased interest in the group. Connecting human rights activists and standards 
                                                 
19  This interviewee did not wish to be directly quoted. 
20  See Clark (1992) and https://www.ietf.org/tao.html, para. 257 
21  https://irtf.org/hrpc  
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developers holds great promise in beginning to frame technical standards in terms of their social impacts 
and consequences. In future, the IETF may even embed this work directly into standards development. 
 
The IRTF has also made efforts to decrease its historic reliance on NIST for cryptographic advice 
by inviting academic cryptographers to participate in the IRTF to create an alternative pool of expertise. 
 
London Mathematical Society  
 
The close relationship between other academic communities and intelligence agencies has caused 
similar concern, as was raised in the interviews. 
 
It just began with reading the newspapers, and when the Snowden revelations first 
came out, I was very interested and read about them, and then, quite slowly in fact, it 
dawned on me that the mathematical community was actually somehow involved in 
these things, because GCHQ [Government Communications Headquarters22] and the 
NSA have always employed a lot of mathematicians. (LMS participant) 
 
After this, the interviewee started to engage the UK mathematical community’s professional 
association, the London Mathematical Society (LMS), in a dialogue about the issue. 
 
For a start, very nearly every mathematician I’ve discussed this with has similar opinions 
to me. They are extremely uncomfortable with what we now know that GCHQ and the 
NSA are doing. That’s at the level of individuals. I think institutions respond in a much 
different way because there’s this illusion that it’s possible for an institution to be 
neutral. Let’s say you’re head of a university department and some opportunity comes 
up to collaborate with GCHQ, you might like to imagine that you’re just a neutral conduit 
of information and you pass that information on to your department. (LMS participant) 
 
This disconnection between the technical details of research and its potential social impact exists 
not only in the mathematical community but also within the larger ICT research community, where a kind 
of cognitive dissonance occurs in which the actions of researchers are not associated with the resultant 
consequences (Eden, Jirotka, & Stahl, 2014). The debate continues within the LMS. 
 
International Association for Cryptologic Research  
 
Another professional association, the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), 
has responded to the Snowden disclosures with the release of the Copenhagen Declaration,23 which states 
that the association’s members reject the compromise of cryptographic standards and that research 
should be undertaken to protect personal privacy against governmental and corporate overreach. 
However, members of the IACR who work for intelligence agencies did not engage in the debate that led 
                                                 
22  Government Communications Headquarters is the UK’s signals intelligence agency. 
23  https://www.iacr.org/misc/statement-May2014.html  
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to the declaration. An interviewee told us that whenever there are discussions about surveillance issues, 
these members sit in silence, which can lead to tensions within the community. 
 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers  
 
The Snowden revelations have brought into focus issues of Internet governance, with a renewed 
effort to move beyond ICANN’s historic operational control by the U.S. government (Bradshaw et al., 
2015; Gibbs, 2013). A full discussion of Internet governance post-Snowden is beyond the scope of this 
article, but one interviewee highlighted ICANN’s data retention agreement, instituted in 2013, as 
especially contentious in light of the Snowden disclosures. The agreement concerns access to information 
about the owners of domain names. At issue is ICANN’s request that registrars hold their customers’ 
personal data in escrow for 18 months. The data are escrowed with Iron Mountain, a U.S. defense 
contractor. 
 
The whole point of that escrow requirement, nominally it’s to protect users just in case 
your registrar turns out to be a fly-by-night. . . . So they need some data, but the kind 
of level of data they’re asking these guys to retain is much more of a surveillance 
measure than it is reasonable. (ICANN and IEEE participant) 
 
The European Data Protection Supervisor wrote to ICANN expressing concern over the data 
escrow requirements, noting that the practice was illegal in the European Union. The issue remains 
unresolved. 
 
In terms of what the attitude is or was, remembering that the Internet came out of 
DARPA [U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] and there’s still a huge U.S. 
military interest in it, I think there is kind of sous-entendu, an understanding that 
surveillance is part of the U.S.’s interest in this stuff, but nobody talks about it. It’s not 
really talked about at ICANN. (ICANN and IEEE participant) 
 
Since our interviews took place, ICANN has formed a working group to consider whether the 
existing policies for managing information about domain name owners should be replaced.24 
 
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers  
 
The availability of information about domain name owners will affect a growing number of people 
with the rise of Internet-connected consumer devices—the so-called Internet of things. When one of our 
interviewees raised this issue in an IEEE working group, the concerns were dismissed in the session, but 
privately acknowledged by several participants. This illustrates how concerns about the social effects of 
technical decisions can be excluded from working group discussions unless an effort is made to include 
them explicitly within the working group’s remit. 
 
                                                 
24 http://whois.icann.org/sites/default/files/files/final-issue-report-next-generation-rds-07oct15-en.pdf  
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Global Certification Forum  
 
The GCF certifies implementations of mobile communication standards produced by the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Within this certification organization, the Snowden revelations 
have not been discussed. 
 
I wonder a little bit myself because it’s not openly discussed. . . . But I think the level of 
awareness or willingness to have a look and say this is what has happened since 
Snowden—that has to have an impact on us, let’s tighten up our security testing or 
something, [but] I don’t see that happening yet on a grand scale. . . . So I don’t think it 
has changed much so far at least. (GCF participant) 
 
Because mobile communications standards fall within the telecommunications domain, where 
designing systems to support “lawful intercept” surveillance is an industry norm, there is limited scope for 
developing systems that protect against surveillance. 
 
3GPP consists of network manufacturers and network operators who are bound by the 
laws of governments, and laws of nations that require lawful intercept. So even if they 
wanted to develop something like end-to-end encryption, they can certainly do that but 
then governments would not allow end-to-end encryption in networks to be used 
because then that would break their lawful intercept. (GCF participant) 
 
Requirements for lawful intercept access have not been challenged by the telecommunications 
industry despite the abuse of these capabilities revealed by Snowden. At the time of writing, the 3GPP is 
in the process of standardizing an encrypted telephony protocol developed by GCHQ. Like the Clipper 
proposal from the 1990s, the protocol enables calls to be decrypted for surveillance purposes (Murdoch, 
2016). 
 
World Wide Web Consortium  
 
The W3C does not have a stated policy on surveillance or privacy, but a number of W3C 
standards explicitly address privacy issues (Doty, 2015), and the organization's director has been an 
outspoken critic of NSA surveillance (Warr, 2013). 
 
The Snowden revelations had an impact on the already-established Tracking Protection working 
group,25 which aims to increase individuals’ privacy and control when browsing websites. The group’s Do 
Not Track standard focuses on enabling the expression of privacy preferences, thus making it possible to 
block or accept tracking elements in Web browsing sessions. The Do Not Track discussions began in 2011, 
and the Snowden revelations have affected the group’s work. Interestingly, the working group lost 
participation because the civil society organizations involved wanted to focus their resources on the 
implications of the Snowden disclosures, and many left the group to do so. 
                                                 
25 https://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection  
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Although Do Not Track would eventually protect consumers, it would be a voluntary 
implementation on the part of advertisers and other companies that track website visitors. Many browsers 
have a Do Not Track option available, but this merely asks websites not to track visitors who enable the 
option. Whether the request is honored or not is up to the companies who do the tracking. This example 
demonstrates the effects of market influence and voluntarism: without voluntary adoption of this standard 
by advertisers, which would go against their commercial interests, the standard is ineffective. Only if the 
standard were to become a legal requirement could privacy advocates ensure that it would function in all 
circumstances. We may conclude from this that when the technical features of the Internet and World 
Wide Web have a direct impact on citizen privacy and security, the voluntary approach to standards 
negotiation and adoption may not be adequate for addressing the concerns of wider society. 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology  
 
When evidence of a backdoor in Dual EC DRBG was published in September 2013, NIST released 
a statement saying that it “would not deliberately weaken a cryptographic standard” (NIST, 2013, para. 
2). However, in the same statement it reminded the public that “NIST is required by statute to consult 
with the NSA” (NIST, 2013, para. 4). NIST subsequently invited a committee of external experts to 
investigate how the flawed standard came to be published despite the recognized possibility of a backdoor 
(Cerf et al., 2014). The Snowden revelations were cited in several of the committee members’ individual 
reports as being the catalyst for the NIST review. 
 
The committee recommended that NIST review its relationship with the NSA and request changes 
from the U.S. government as necessary to ensure its independence. The memorandum of understanding 
between the two agencies is currently under review, but no statutory changes have been proposed (NIST, 
2015). Another recommendation was that NIST should increase its cryptographic expertise and seek 
advice from outside experts to reduce its dependence on the NSA.  
 
I think, in general, the people of NIST were quite shocked by this, and they tried to get 
their act together and build again trust in the community, but I think it’s going to be a 
long-term process. And, of course, the fact remains that NSA has hundreds and 
hundreds of cryptographers and has access to literature from decades old, and they 
collaborate also with other agencies and, of course, NIST has maybe a handful of 
cryptographers and even if they double this to 10 or 15, they still will be, in terms of 
expertise and track record, running behind in some areas. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, and NIST 
participant) 
 
In response to the committee’s findings, NIST increased its annual budget for cryptographic work 
by $6 million (NIST, 2015). The NSA program for subverting cryptographic standards and implementations 
has an annual budget of more than $250 million (Perlroth et al., 2013). 
 
The NIST standard describing Dual EC DRBG was finally revised in June 2015 to remove the 
flawed algorithm, 10 years after participants in the ANSI working group first recognized the possibility of a 
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backdoor. An implementation of the standard in hardware sold by Juniper Networks was withdrawn in 
January 2016 after the backdoor was found to have been taken over by an unknown party (Goodin, 2016). 
 
Mitigating the Influence of Intelligence Agencies  
 
The Snowden revelations have drawn renewed attention to the role of intelligence agencies in the 
standards-making process, and cast doubt on the adequacy of current mechanisms for ensuring the 
integrity and trustworthiness of standards. Our interviewees described various measures that standards 
bodies are exploring that might help to mitigate this influence. 
 
Open and Transparent Processes  
 
The concepts of openness and transparency are accepted by some participants in standards 
bodies as sufficient protection against intelligence agency influence. An open standards-making process is 
one in which anyone can participate, all documents related to the negotiation process are published, and 
the standard itself is publicly available. Proponents of the open model argue that since everyone is aware 
that participants may seek to further their own interests, attempts to influence decision making can be 
recognized and countered. 
 
The way we work is just open, and if we’re open, that means we don’t fire people 
because they change affiliation or because of a given affiliation. We look at their 
arguments and we look at what their output is, examine it as the best we can and that’s 
the only defense we have. (IETF participant) 
 
The main way to defend against that is openness and transparency . . . to have more 
people who have the right politics involved and engaged and getting into these 
arguments, going forward and saying, I hear that you want to propose this particular 
way to solve this problem, but it’s going to cause these other issues down the line and 
it’s going to leave us open to these other concerns and we really need to stop it. (IETF 
and IRTF participant) 
 
One of our interviewees drew an analogy between intelligence agency subversion of standards 
and attempts by companies to insert patented technologies into standards to charge license fees later, a 
practice known as submarining: 
 
We’ve had to deal with patents for decades, and from the point of view of the standards 
process, subverting it for national government purposes on the quiet is kind of like 
trying to do a submarine, get your patent into the standard. . . . We do everything in the 
open and so therefore everybody just needs to examine what’s being suggested and 
think about who is the person suggesting it and they might be suspicious of that and if 
they are, they themselves will go off and do more examination. (IETF participant) 
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A question left unanswered by these descriptions of ideal transparent processes is who 
specifically is responsible for critically examining the contributions of working group participants. If the 
IETF’s claim that participants are not representatives of organizations is accepted, then no participant has 
a special responsibility to perform such scrutiny—unless it is the working group chairs, whose own 
affiliations are excluded from consideration. This seems a weak position from which to resist deliberate 




Other interviewees argued for a different kind of open process: public competitions, in which 
entrants submit proposals to meet a published set of criteria, the proposals are evaluated in public by a 
panel of judges, and the winning proposal is standardized. By selecting a single winner, this model can 
avoid the complexity that arises when trying to reconcile competing proposals. NIST has used this model 
to develop some of its cryptographic standards, and because of the transparency of the process, these 
standards have remained trusted even after the Dual EC DRBG revelations. 
 
We have in crypto something which is I think pretty unique. You can compare it a bit to 
the Olympic Games for cryptographers. So if NIST wants a specific standard in an area, 
they actually invite everybody to submit their candidates . . . there is a four-year-long 
competition and in the end, NIST selects a winner. So they also have to motivate why 
they select certain algorithms. So I think this is actually the best way to develop 
standards because it’s open and transparent, and also NIST enforces to submitters that 
if their algorithm is selected, it will be available for free to everybody. (ETSI, IACR, ISO, 
and NIST participant) 
 
The NIST Committee of Visitors report (Cerf et al., 2014) recommends that NIST host more open 
cryptographic competitions that engage academics and industry worldwide in the peer-reviewed selection 
of standards. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the trust NIST earned in the past through its use 
of competitions might have contributed to the acceptance of Dual EC DRBG, which was developed using a 
less transparent process. For competitions to be fully effective in mitigating the subversion of standards, 
they should be clearly distinguished from standards developed by other means. 
 
Although competitions have been successful in cryptography, they may not be suitable for all 
fields. They require criteria that can be agreed on in advance by all entrants, as well as the possibility for 
less powerful participants to produce entries of comparable quality to their dominant rivals. Where these 
conditions are not met, some participants may prefer an unequal negotiation process rather than a 
winner-takes-all contest. 
 
Explicit Inclusion of Political Concerns in Standards  
 
The IRTF’s Human Rights Protocol Considerations research group is making a fundamental 
response to the issue of intelligence agency influence on standards, as well as other technological threats 
to individual rights, by exploring whether human rights can be explicitly recognized as criteria that 
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technical standards must meet. A draft standard under development by the group contains “a proposal for 
guidelines for human rights considerations, similar to the work done on the guidelines for privacy 
considerations” (ten Oever & Cath, 2016, p. 1) that is already part of the IETF standards process. 
 
The ongoing struggle over Internet governance suggests, however, that the inclusion of political 
concerns in the process is not by itself sufficient to ensure that those concerns are addressed. Continued 
participation in the standards-making process by civil society groups will also be needed to ensure that 
human rights remain an active focus of debate rather than receiving only superficial acknowledgment. At 
the time of this writing, neither the open process favored by the IETF and IRTF nor the more restricted 




The Snowden revelations have profound implications for the design of communication 
infrastructures, in which the technical issues cannot be separated from questions of commercial and 
political influence, global governance, and human rights. Various actors intervene in the standards-making 
process for various purposes, and disentangling the links between these actors, their objectives, and the 
technical capabilities codified in a standard can be extraordinarily difficult. Thankfully, there is growing 
recognition of these issues within the standards-making community. This is reflected in the work of the 
IRTF on translating human rights considerations into criteria for standards development; in the debate 
within the IETF over intelligence agency participation in working groups; and in the NIST Committee of 
Visitors’s recommendations for the development of a more independent and transparent process. On the 
other hand, in the telecommunications industry we see little debate over these issues and a continued 
acceptance of surveillance as an industry norm. 
 
In each of these cases, the adequacy of current processes for developing standards has been cast 
into doubt. We ask the question: What if standards for digital communication were developed and defined 
within legal frameworks as they are in other domains such as food, building, and product safety? What if 
technical standards were legally required to include elements in their specifications that defend and uphold 
the principles of human rights, security, and privacy? When government agencies are willing to exploit the 
social vulnerabilities found in institutional processes just as readily as the technical vulnerabilities found in 
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